EXHIBIT B

1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
2	COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA			
3	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARY E. ARAND, JUDGE			
4	DEPARTMENT NO. 9			
5	000			
6	DALANMED MEGUNOLOGIEG ING			
7	PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Plaintiff,			
8	PIAINCILI,			
9	VS. CASE NO. 16CV299476			
_	MARC L. ABRAMOWITZ,			
10	Defendant.			
11	/			
12				
13	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS			
14	February 13, 2018			
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16	APPEARANCES:			
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18	For the Plaintiff: BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER, LLP BY: JOHN T. ZACH, ATTORNEY			
19	DAVID ZIFKIN, ATTORNEY JUAN VALDIVIESO, ATTORNEY			
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21	For the Defendant: SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM BY: ALLEN RUBY, ATTORNEY			
22	WILLIAM J. CASEY, ATTORNEY JACK P. DICANIO, ATTORNEY			
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26	Official Reporter: TALTY COURT REPORTERS, INC.			
27	Cambria Denlinger, CSR 14009			
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1 San Jose, California February 13, 2018 2 PROCEEDINGS: 3 THE COURT: Appearances, please. 4 MR. ZACH: Good morning, your Honor. John Zach and David Zifkin from Boies Schiller on behalf of 5 Plaintiff. 6 7 MR. RUBY: Good morning, your Honor. Allen 8 Ruby, Jack DiCanio, and William Casey here for defendants. 9 10 THE COURT: And you are? 11 MR. VALDIVIESO: Juan Valdivieso from Boies 12 Schiller and Flexner on behalf of Palantir. 13 THE COURT: One lawyer on each side. 14 So reading through this motion, there were a 15 couple of things in it that I think are not entirely 16 accurate with the law in that they do not need to prove 17 that they have a trade secret to do a trade secret 18 disclosure. They're just doing this to let you know 19 that what they claim their trade secret to be. 2.0 Secondly, the Court doesn't look at whether the 2.1 trade secret is a trade secret, for example, by 22 examining whether or not it's in the public domain or 23 not. So that's not a relevant factor in this. The only 24 question for the Court is whether the trade secret 25 adequately describes the trade secret so we can move 26 forward in the case and do discovery on it. Now, one thing I think Plaintiff's counsel 27 28 needs to be aware is the trade secret is it. So if you



later tried to expand on what you claim your trade secret to be, you're kind of stuck with what's in this. Do you understand that?

MR. ZIFKIN: I do understand that, your Honor. There is case law that there has to be good cause to amend, of course, but we understand that this is our discloser obligation, and that we're moving it to the Court.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Ruby, you want to comment on that? This is not a source code case, so they don't need to disclose source code. I've been told source code is not at issue. So in what ways do you think this disclosure is inadequate? And I know that trade secrets can include compilations and that sort of thing, which is kind of what it looks like to me your trade secret is. Is that a fair statement?

MR. ZIFKIN: That's fair.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Ruby.

MR. RUBY: Your Honor, I appreciate the Court's guidance as it said about what they do and do not need to do. From a practical standpoint, this report of the disclosure discloses nothing. It uses buzz words. Everything is a concept and a system and a compilation. There are plenty of those and according to the purported disclosure, it works great. Everybody would want one or more, but it doesn't tell us anything to allow us to defend the case as the statute contemplates we're entitled to defend it.



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THE COURT: Can I ask what they would need to 1 2 do for it to be an adequate trade secret disclosure in the context of what they're claiming here? 3 Sure. A trade secret disclosure --4 MR. RUBY: let me use a phrase that's not classically a legal 5 phrase, but it's useful in this. The trade secret 6 disclosure needs to tell us, as the defendant, what the 7 special sauce is. You know, it can't be conclusory, and 8 can't say it allows the calculation of insurance 9 10 premiums based on such and such. 11 Well, that's actually a conclusion that that's 12 what it does, but it doesn't say that's what makes it a 13 trade secret. Is it that this product allows people to 14 do things blindfolded? Or to do it with less human 15 resources? Or to do it quicker as shown by such and 16 such? 17 Could I invite the Court, please, if it has the 18 disclosure up there with it --19 THE COURT: I'm looking for it. It's in here 20 somewhere. 2.1 MR. ZIFKIN: I have an additional copy if you 22 want. 23 THE COURT: I've got it right here. 24 MR. ZIFKIN: The one thing I would ask, your 25 Honor, is that if counsel -- again, we filed this under 26 seal, and the parties have agreed that pursuant to the Court's issuing a protective order that it will be 27 28 maintained as being confidential. So I would ask that



he not read it out loud, but he, sort of, can summarize it more abstractly. I think that's sort of -- we have to try to maintain its secrecy. I understand he has to make his argument. I want to let him to do that however he can, but I would like to avoid him just reading it wholesale. Directing the Court's attention to it is probably fine.

MR. RUBY: I'm not trying to take a cheap shot by getting into the trade secret. The whole point is, I'm trying to answer the Court's question by pointing out that there's no trade secret in here.

Could I invite the Court, please, if it would, to, say, look at No. 4. This is a pretty easy target -- the whole thing -- but if we could look at No. 4 describing something to do with insurance. Are we looking at the same paragraph?

There's apparently this product that does or allows for calculating risk and potential damages and premiums. Apparently it's a tool for computing premiums.

My point is, if you look at No. 4, that's what every insurance company since the beginning of time has done: Looks at the risk; looks at the cost of a bad event, and allows for the computation of premiums.

Well, that's fine. That's describes, perhaps, a lawful business, but it's not a trade secret. There's nothing about it that's secret; that's nothing that even gives a clue as to how it derives economic value from



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secrecy.

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So getting back to your Honor's question a minute ago, what would they have to do? Well, if there were a trade secret -- of course, we don't think there is -- but if there were a trade secret that under lay the item that's disclosed in No. 4, it would say What is special about the way it does this? What distinguishes this purported tool from what insurance companies have historically and always done in terms of setting premiums? Look the risk, look at cost, look at pricing. That's what they say they're doing.

And, your Honor, if the Court please, the same could be said for every single one of these 39 purported trade secrets. These are generic descriptions. So to use a more formal term "special sauce." What a trade secret disclosure can't do, if it's to comply with the law, is to be generic, to be conclusionary, and generic. And that's all this is.

If I were to -- counsel doesn't want me to so I won't read No. 4 into the record -- but --

THE COURT: I've just read it.

MR. RUBY: Sure. And if No. 4 were to be published on the front page of the San Jose Mercury, so what? What possible secret could be revealed or disclosed by No. 4?

This trade secret purported disclosure was done carefully to give away no information. Your Honor is well aware of the pulling and tugging that goes on in



alleged trade secret claims.

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THE COURT: I would have been involved in those cases, yes.

MR. RUBY: And your Honor never pulled nor tugged, I'm sure, but for the rest of us, we're doing the best we can. Your Honor is a fount of information, I'm sure, but that's the exception. And the statute maybe doesn't require that degree of forthcomingness, but it requires enough to let us defend.

If this were the approved trade secret disclosure, not only are we handicapped in the defense, but let me go, if I could, to your Honor's advisement of the parties that the trade secret disclosure document, absent good cause or unusual circumstances, is what the plaintiff is stuck with.

Well, when it's this broad, I mean -- again, use No. 4 for example. If this were the allowed designated trade secret, it's broad enough to describe anything having to do with insurance rates set, isn't it? This is a very, very big tent that they've created here, and that's not fair. There's got to be some limitation that's part of the disclosure. In other words, it has to limit what's disclosed to something that can be understood in a reasonable away, and they can impose boundaries as the litigation goes forward. Otherwise, all the battling that goes on now, as your Honor knows, just gets repeated at every stage.

So, there are -- finally, if I may? They



say -- we don't necessarily agree with this -- but they say, the trade secret -- their trade secrets -- are disclosed in Mr. Abramowitz's patent applications.

THE COURT: Those are public documents.

MR. RUBY: That's what they say. And we say, which I think is pretty reasonable, if that were true — that's what they say, okay. One easy way to shortcut a lot of this pulling and tugging would be for them to extract specifically what it is that's in the patent application that they say describes their trade secret instead of dumping on the Court and everybody a big stack of patent applications, and say It's in there. We're assuring you it is. Go find it.

They say that it's disclosed in the patent applications. It seems it would be a very small step for them, if that were true, to say Here's where it says X. That describes one of our trade secrets.

Why go to the trouble -- I think we know why -- but why go to the trouble for a legitimate reason to create a parallel, or a different disclosure, which is as broad and generic as this if, according to them, there are public documents that already describes their trade secrets?

MR. ZIFKIN: I would address that in two ways.

One is, at this stage, right, this is -- discovery's

been stopped. So the moment discovery starts, I expect

I'm going to get an interrogatory from my colleague

saying Please identify all parts of the patent



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application in which you identify which map on to this.

THE COURT: Why don't you have them in here?

I'm not seeing something that says it's, quote, patent application.

MR. ZIFKIN: Because I don't think we have to do that at this stage under the law. We'll answer to the interrogatory, that's going to be our obligation. But moving beyond --

THE COURT: I suspect I'll see a motion to compel on that one. Let me just start with something I want to do in this case which is to set up a process where you are required to have an informal discovery conference before filing any motion to compel. There's something new in the code about that that I've had in a few cases that I've adopted such a process, but now the code specifically allows me to. There's a new code section that says that, so I'm going to require that for this case.

So set it up by calling my clerk, and we'll do Friday at 10:00, something like that. That will be make it easier for us to talk about trade secrets before motions to compel are filed. So that's just a digression.

MR. ZIFKIN: That's great. We really appreciate that, and I think we have pretty open dialogue between the sides anyway, so that would be good.

So the point is, we -- the disclosure is



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sufficient enough to let them -- put them on notice to make their defenses and to investigate the borderline of whether or not these things are secrets or whether or not they're generally known. That's what we're entitled to do. That's --

THE COURT: This is pretty general. It has a lot of words that don't necessarily, to me, say a lot. And I think this doesn't disclose anything secret. They all start with proprietary business plan concepts this and that does this thing, but it doesn't tell anybody how it does those things.

MR. ZIFKIN: For the one that counsel pointed out, No. 4, that does map on to part of the patent application -- one of the patent applications that Mr. Abramowitz filed. And in filing them, Mr. Abramowitz himself is claiming they're novel; they're not known. Those concepts aren't things that are generally out there. So I think he's on board with enough notice to understand that this --

THE COURT: So he's filed these patent applications. He's, obviously, claiming he invented these things, so I think that you are under an obligation to tell him what things he claims he invented were in fact -- belonged to you.

And so him having filed -- I don't think he's on notice if you simply say he could just look at his own patent applications. I think you need to say what in his patent applications are concepts that belong to



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your client.

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MR. ZIFKIN: That's fair. I want to be clear; that's not what we're doing. What we're also doing is he -- counsel started off today arguing that, you know, it's hard for him to understand this because it's filled with buzz words. The language to articulate these secrets are too general. We made a point of referring to the patent applications in our papers to show that these are the same words that are used in the patent. And the same words are used in these areas that they do, in fact -- can understand them. They do understand what we are planning to be our secret, using this type of language, and that that's enough for them to move forward.

That's why we did the side-by-side with the bold because, you know, they keep saying I don't understand what this means; this isn't specific enough, but it really does map on to what they're saying.

THE COURT: I do think Mr. Ruby has a point in that this looks like the universe of ideas, and I think you do have an obligation to narrow it down to something that is your trade secret and describe it more specifically, because this is so generic, it could include a whole, huge number of things. And I think this document does need to do that narrowing in some respects.

MR. ZIFKIN: The one thing -- I mean, we respect the Court's opinion on that, obviously. The one



thing I'd like to point out is that it's not an all or nothing sort of proposition. He's pointing to one.

They had another one that they were able to understand, No. 13, which was already publicly disclosed.

THE COURT: I don't think that's relevant for this analysis, but in any event --

MR. ZIFKIN: That's right. But the point being they're able to actually achieve the statutory goal that the trade secret law is in place to advance, and they can do that. And I think the parties are able to line up discovery going forward.

We're more than happy to answer that interrogatory when we get it, but I don't think it should be a way to delay discovery in the context of a protective order going forward. That will delay the case; they're going to get that information anyway. The disclosure is sufficient to meet the statutory bar at this very discrete stage -- early stage.

MR. RUBY: Well, I think counsel, respectfully, misunderstands what the legislature did here. The legislature prescribed -- or requires the plaintiff in a trade secret case -- every plaintiff -- to do something before discovery starts. And what the plaintiff needs to do is describe their trade secrets in a reasonable fashion -- I don't want to be repeating myself. The idea that well, we're on notice. That's a word that should give the Court some real pause. This is not a



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matter of the notice pleading. This is a special statute for special purposes to allow defendants to have some special protection in trade secret cases, and that's a legislative judgment that these kind of cases need that degree of protection.

The idea that somehow a defendant is on notice of something distorts the burden here. What -- this is not a subjective test. Well, yeah, but Mr. Abramowitz, he probably understands this. He probably understands that. He can read the tea leaves.

The statute isn't set up that way. The statute is a uniform requirement requiring every plaintiff to lay out his or her trade secret in a reasonable way to allow the defense and the discovery to go forward. So I think trying to shortcut that with the idea that somebody is on notice of something is not a helpful path to efficient litigation and doesn't harmonize, in my respectful opinion, of the statute.

THE COURT: Two minutes.

MR. ZIFKIN: So, you know, the standard is reasonable particularity. And the reasonable particularity so they can go out and investigate the claims and prepare their defenses, and our disclosure actually does that. We're not saying that Mr. Abramowitz should know or he shouldn't. We think our disclosure is sufficient enough. I do think it is telling that Mr. Abramowitz wasn't even shown this disclosure. So they claim to not understand it, but



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they sort of -- they're clear in their papers that they didn't bother to show it to him. And it's important because we're all working together to try to understand these things so we can focus the litigation and make it go efficiently. It's because they know what the words are and the language are because they really do map on to the language used by Mr. Abramowitz, and I think our disclosure is sufficient, and that they'll be able to acquire the information they want once discovery starts, which should be immediately. Thank you, your Honor.

MR. RUBY: I'll submit the matter, your Honor.

THE COURT: I think you need to make this more detailed. I do think it's too general. I think you need to -- and, no, I'm not going to take any more argument. For example, I think you do need to point out where in the patent your trade secrets are found. This does not do that. I think you need to give -- the descriptions are so general it could apply to any number of things, and I think it needs to clearly lay out what your trade secrets are. So I'm going to require you amend this, say, within 20 days.

MR. ZIFKIN: Can I propose one thing, your Honor? I take their point; they want the specific citations to the patent applications. We'll do that --

THE COURT: Not just that. To the extent there's something broader in the patent applications, I think you need to lay it out here with more specificity than is found here. In looking at this, I can't tell



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what your trade secret might be and how you go about doing certain things to accomplish the things that are here. So I think it needs to be more specific.

MR. ZIFKIN: Well, we will amended, your Honor. The thing is, we would like to do this on an expedited basis, because we are -- this case has been going on for quite some time. They tried to move to federal court, and we got it sent back to your Honor.

THE COURT: You know, that's something that defendants can do in cases like this. And, yes, the federal court sent it back. You can amend it anytime you want. And I think you submitted an order. I don't know if you have any comments on the order, but -- and I don't know if you want to modify the order, Mr. Ruby, or not but -- trying to find it. The order staying discovery.

MR. RUBY: Your Honor, if the court please, rather than consume the Court's time this morning, I will recirculate a copy of the proposed order to counsel. If they have comments, we'll try to work that out and present to the Court something we can agree on immediately, and if we can't, we'll submit competing orders.

THE COURT: So looking at your proposed order, it provides that all discovery shall be stayed until Palantir submits the disclosure that complies with Section 292.210. That's a little bit vague. Who makes the decision of whether they have complied? Ultimately,



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it might be me, but when you get it, you need to -- I'm
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      going to expect you to communicate with them and say
      this is enough to be going on to file another motion
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      immediately. And I know it's tough to get hearing dates
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      with me. This is something that maybe we can set on
      Friday at 10:00 so we can have a little more complete
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      discussion.
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               MR. RUBY: Understood.
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               MR. ZIFKIN: That will be very helpful, your
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      Honor, to the extent they're --
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               THE COURT: But I don't think it should be
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      generic until it complies. I think there needs to be
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      some standard and who decides it and why. If you think
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      it's become adequate, then you need to just start
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      doing -- allowing discovery to happen.
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               MR. RUBY: I understand, your Honor, and we'll
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      work out some compliance order with your Honor.
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               MR. ZIFKIN: Thank you, your Honor.
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               MR. RUBY: Thank you.
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               (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded
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               at 9:46 a.m.)
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1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	
3	STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
4) SS.
5	COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA)
6	
7	I, CAMBRIA L. DENLINGER, do hereby certify that
8	the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the
9	proceedings had in the above-entitled action held on the
10	above-entitled date;
11	That I reported the same in stenotype to the
12	best of my ability being the qualified and acting
13	Official Court Reporter of the Superior Court of the
14	State of California, in and for the County of Santa
15	Clara, and thereafter had the same transcribed into
16	typewriting as herein appears.
17	I further certify that I have complied with CCP
18	237 (a)(2) and that all personal juror identifying
19	information has been redacted, if applicable.
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21	Dated this 13th day of February, 2018.
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